

# PAUL ERGÜN HILD

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**Education** **University of Mannheim**  
Ph.D. in Economics, 2020 – 2026 (expected)  
*Research visit:* Stockholm School of Economics, February – May 2025  
**Central European University**  
M.A. in Economics (*distinction*), 2020  
**ADA University**  
B.Sc. in Economics, 2018

**Fields** Primary Field: Behavioral and Experimental Economics  
Secondary Fields: Labor, Political Economy

**References** Henrik Orzen Wladislaw Mill  
University of Mannheim University of Mannheim  
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Anna Dreber Almenberg Guido Friebe  
Stockholm School of Economics Goethe University Frankfurt  
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**Relevant Experience** Researcher, Market Design Department, ZEW Mannheim, 2023–Present  
Teaching Assistant, Economics Department, University of Mannheim, 2023–Present  
Research Assistant, Economics Department, CEU, 2019–2020

**Job Market Paper** **Competing Against Stereotypes: Stereotyped Beliefs and Willingness to Compete**  
(with Michael Hilweg-Waldeck)

Career choice, earnings, and other key economic outcomes have been linked to gender differences in willingness to compete. This paper examines how gender stereotypes shape these differences. We conduct a meta-study of prior work and demonstrate that the wide variation in gender competition gaps can be explained by stereotypes: Men enter competitions more in traditionally male-stereotyped domains, whereas in female-stereotyped domains, the gap is smaller or even reversed. Importantly, these differences are not explained by gender gaps in performance. To explore mechanisms, we collect belief data in an elicitation experiment. We find that stereotyped beliefs about gender performance differences explain more than half of the variation in competition gaps in the literature. Next, we experimentally manipulate stereotypes through framing and informational cues about others' beliefs. Although these interventions significantly shift beliefs, the effects do not translate into changes in competitive behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of stereotypes in shaping gender gaps in competitiveness while suggesting that shifting beliefs alone is unlikely to close these gaps without deeper or longer-term interventions.

## Working Papers

### **Why Don't Donors Deduct? Social Norms and the Limits of Tax Incentives**

(with Michael Hilweg-Waldeck)

Many donors leave tax benefits unclaimed even when doing so requires minimal effort and yields meaningful financial rewards. Findings from our representative survey point to confusion about how to deduct donations and to misperceived social norms about the moral appropriateness of doing so as the main drivers of this gap. We study how to tackle these two sources of the deduction gap by providing concise information on how to deduct donations and a one-sentence norm cue in an online experiment ( $n = 483$ ), a door-to-door field experiment with address-level randomization ( $n = 6,728$ ), and a radio-based campaign spanning two Austrian federal states. We find that almost all donors deduct when donating through the anonymous online tool. By contrast, during face-to-face fundraising, where social-image concerns are salient, fewer than 1 in 100 donors choose to do so. Across settings, information on how to deduct donations alone leaves deduction behavior unchanged, whereas combining this information with the norm cue increases take-up in the door-to-door setting. Our findings show that financial incentives can falter when clashing with misperceived norms in social settings, unless paired with campaigns that reshape those norms.

### **Inequality as a Constraint on (Repugnant) Markets**

(with Jakob Schmidhäuser)

When third parties oppose repugnant transactions, legal bans often prevent welfare-improving trades. We provide the first causal evidence that financial inequality between transacting parties drives such opposition. In a pre-registered vignette experiment ( $N = 1,073$ ), we alter the income levels of buyer and seller across five vignettes describing repugnant transactions. We test the effect in two independent samples (a U.S. sample and a sample drawn from selected European countries) and find that inequality increases willingness to prevent transactions by 21%. The effect goes beyond the effect of low income: opposition rises substantially more when a low-income seller faces a richer buyer than when both parties have equally low incomes. Inequality also affects repugnance norms, suggesting it strengthens the collectively enforced character of repugnance. Moreover, we show that the same market can be contested for opposing reasons depending on the relational context: under equal incomes, high prices increase opposition (coercion); under inequality, low prices increase opposition (exploitation). Our findings suggest that market design addressing socioeconomic asymmetry between parties may reduce resistance to repugnant markets.

## Papers in Progress

### **Non-Standard Choice and Matching**

(with Gian Caspari, Vincent Meisner, Michael Hilweg-Waldeck), *working on the draft*

Choice mistakes arise when individuals' observed choices deviate from their underlying preferences, often due to cognitive overload or complex menus. This project studies such mistakes in matching markets through a controlled laboratory experiment. Participants face real-effort tasks bundled into menus of varying complexity. These are allocated via different assignment mechanisms, including classic serial dictatorship and a novel sequentialized variant. The design allows us to measure when and why mistakes occur and to evaluate how simplifying choice environments affects efficiency, stability, and incentive properties of market design.

## Teaching Experience

Business Economics I (Game Theory), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2025  
Business Economics I (Game Theory), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2024  
Business Economics II (IO), Teaching Assistant, Spring 2024  
Business Economics II (IO), Teaching Assistant, Spring 2023

<b>Awards</b>	IAREP/ELSEVIER Best Student Paper, 2025
<b>Seminars &amp; Conferences</b>	Chicago School in Experimental Economics, 2025 Western Economic Association International, 2025 Prague Conference on Behavioral Sciences, 2025 Valencia IMBESS, 2025 Florence MBEE, 2025 Stockholm School of Economics (Brown Bag), 2025 Stockholm University IIES (Brown Bag), 2025 Verona Experimental Meeting, 2024 Gender Gaps Conference, 2024 EER Summer School in Experimental Economics, 2024 Innsbruck Winter School on Credence Goods, 2022
<b>Academic Service</b>	HeiKaMaxY Workshop, 2024, organizer Conference on Research with and within Organizations, 2024, organizer
<b>Contributions</b>	Fišar, M., Greiner, B., Huber, C., Katok, E., Ozkes, A., and the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration (2024). Reproducibility in Management Science. <i>Management Science</i>
<b>Languages</b>	English, German, Azerbaijani, Turkish
<b>Software Skills</b>	Stata, R, Python, JavaScript, LaTeX, oTree
<b>Citizenship</b>	German; Azerbaijan